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Digital signature can be used to authenticate the identity of the signer and
ptotect data integrity as the analogue of normal signature. Signer computes
the signature according to the algorithm with secret key and the message. Any
opponent cannot forge the signature for he doesn’t know the secret key of the
signer. The verifier can verify the signature with the public information.
For example, a couple of people vote on a document in a meeting. It
is a valid signature if the signature is created by more than given number of
people. A threshold group signature scheme is a solution to this problem. Our
threshold signature scheme combines the speciality of Mignotte Sequence with
the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Signature is accomplished and get across
the verification when no less than t enties are involved in this signature.
Another utilization: digital bid. Supposed that a institution initiates
a call for tenders, asking some companies to propose their prices for a set
of instruments. A company may capture a competitor’s signed offer on the
transmission line and prepares its offer consequently in order to increase its
chance to be selected . To prevent this, the companies may encrypt their
offers and signatures in order that they may only be read and verified by the
institution. But nothing prevents the latter to reveal them once decrypted.
Indeed, since the institution’s goal is to obtain a good price (as low as possible).
It could show some signed offers to some other companies to influence them
in making good offers. Our second scheme is a solution to this problem. With
such designated verifier signature, while the institution is convinced about the
origin and the authenticity of an offer, it cannot transfer this conviction to
others unless it reveal its own secret key used in verification. The security of
this scheme based on the difficulty of the mathematical hard problem in braid
group. Another superiority is that it can conceal the message to be signed. It
is unnecessary to encrypt the message before signing it. Only the institution
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(4) S j V 0:K%=$j?=$B k ∈ K FBK%=$ Sigk(·) ∈ S jFBV?=$ V erk(·, ·) ∈ V FB
Sigk(·) ∈ S  P −→ A Z|j V erk(·, ·) ∈ V  P × A −→{ } Z|AÆPyN!FBy x ∈ P jFBK% y ∈ A  V erk(x, y)= ~P8~ y = Sigk(x) FB







































x = a1mod m1
x = a2mod m2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
x = akmod mk' M = m1m2 . . .mk dF2 x = ∑ki=1 aiMi(M−1i mod mi)(mod M) F0
Mi = M/mi x Mignotte(t ,n) 'U*,X{℄
 n FB0 n ≥ 2, 2 ≤ t ≤ n q m1 < m2 < . . . < mn P
(mi, mj) = 1  1 ≤ i < j ≤ n Vn~ mn−t+2mn−t+1 . . .mn < m1m2 . . . mt0y m1, m2, . . . , mn Ue (t, n) − Mignotte yEFB (t, n)−Mignotte yNÆ(~%ngO4 S  β < S < α, F0 β = mn−t+2mn−t+1 . . .mn, α = m1m2 . . .mt =0Æ Ii :




x = I1mod m1
x = I2mod m2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
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